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1 Introduction
The optimal design of bank capital regulation has always been the subject of
an extensive debate among policymakers and researchers.1 However, regula-
tors now face several new challenges that came only into the spotlight after
the financial crisis of 2008: For example, bank capital requirements should
be designed in a way to ensure that systemic banking crises can be avoided
and fears about financial crises mitigated.2 Moreover, the emergence of finan-
cial intermediaries outside the traditional retail banking sector - the so-called
shadow banks - means that regulating the traditional banks can have unin-
tended consequences like regulatory arbitrage.3 This latter point is a special
concern, since financial instability during the financial crisis of 2008 originated
to a large extent in the shadow banking sector, e.g. in the form of shadow bank
runs.4 There are, however, several unresolved research questions: How costly
are shadow banking crises, as well as fears about such crises? Through which
channels do they affect the real economy? How can bank capital regulation
contribute to mitigating or even eliminating such crises? Do financial crises
lead to new costs of bank capital regulation?
In this paper, we study the macroeconomic effects of imposing capital re-
quirements on retail banks or shadow banks in an economy in which shadow
banking crises arise occasionally and endogenously. They take the form of
rollover crises on the wholesale funding market, on which retail banks lend to
shadow banks. We present several novel findings: First, shadow bank runs
are costly in welfare terms: Eliminating shadow bank runs increases welfare in
consumption equivalent terms by about 1.7 percent. Most of this welfare loss
arises, because fears about future banking crises substantially reduce the lever-
age capacity of banks and hence financial intermediation. Second, retail bank
capital requirements are an effective policy to reduce the frequency of shadow
1See, e.g. Admati and Hellwig (2014) and Gorton and Winton (2017) for an overview.
2See e.g. Angeloni and Faia (2013), Gertler et al. (2016), Begenau (2016), Begenau and
Landvoigt (2018).
3See e.g. Plantin (2015), Ordon˜ez (2018).
4See e.g. Gorton and Metrick (2012) or Covitz et al. (2013). For a recent narrative of
the financial crisis supporting this view, see Gertler and Gilchrist (2018).
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bank runs by allowing retail banks to more easily absorb the liquidated as-
sets of shadow banks in a run. Third, retail bank capital requirements create a
novel spillover effect that increases the size and leverage of the shadow banking
sector as retail bank capital requirements tighten. This spillover works through
shadow banks having a higher leverage capacity as the fears about future bank-
ing crises are reduced. Fourth, because of this additional spillover effect, bank
run risk strengthens the motive to jointly regulate retail and shadow banks.
Figure 1: Total financial assets of commercial banks and shadow banks in the United
States. The data are from the flow of funds and constructed as in Adrian and Shin
(2011). Commercial banks are Total financial assets of U.S.-chartered depository
institutions, including IBFs (FL764090005). Shadow banks are Total financial as-
sets of funding corporations (FL504090005), finance companies (FL614090005) and
issuers of asset-backed securities (FL674090005).
We define shadow banks as financial institutions that first, borrow from
other financial institutions on the wholesale funding market, second, are highly
leveraged, and third, are more efficient than retail banks in lending to the
real economy.5 Examples of shadow banks by our definition include finance
companies, funding corporations, and issuers of asset-backed securities. Taking
5The last characteristic can be thought of as arising due to either benefits of specialization
or due to fewer regulatory restrictions for shadow banks.
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shadow banks into consideration is crucial for three reasons: First, as we can
see in Figure 1, the shadow banking sector has grown tremendously over the
last decades into an essential part of the modern financial system in the United
States.6 Second, it was the collapse of the shadow banking sector that led to
the financial turmoil which eventually turned into a global financial crisis.
Third, there are spillover effects from regulating retail banks on the shadow
banking sector.
Specifically, we consider an economy in the spirit of Gertler, Kiyotaki, and
Prestipino (2016) (henceforth GKP) populated with households, retail banks,
shadow banks, and firms. Households, retail banks and shadow banks make re-
tail loans to firms. Households can make deposits at banks. Banks can borrow
and lend on a wholesale funding market. Banks differ in their retail lending
efficiency, and payout policy. Retail and shadow banks face an endogenous
leverage constraint due to a moral hazard problem. In addition, banks face a
capital requirement, which is set by the regulator. An important part of the
shadow bank business model is the securitization of assets.7 To capture the
effects of securitization in a simple and stylized way, we assume that retail
loans financed with wholesale loans as well as wholesale loans themselves are
subject to the moral hazard problem to a lesser degree than deposit financed
retail loans. In equilibrium, households make deposits to retail banks, which
in turn lend on a wholesale funding market to shadow banks.
Depending on the state of the economy, which includes the net worth of
retail and shadow banks, a second shadow bank run equilibrium with low
asset prices and insolvent shadow banks may exist. This shadow bank run
equilibrium resembles a rollover crisis in Cole and Kehoe (2000) or a bank run
in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015). The intuition is that a fall in the endogenous
price of assets can reduce the value of the banks’ assets below the value of their
liabilities, making them insolvent. This in turn reduces the demand for assets,
leading to a low asset price. Importantly, bank runs are anticipated, and fears
6According to the Global Shadow Banking Monitoring Report 2016 by the Financial
Stability Board, in 2015, shadow banking accounts for 13% of the total financial system,
and the shadow banking to GDP ratio is around 70%.
7See e.g. Adrian and Ashcraft (2012b), Acharya et al. (2013).
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about bank runs affect the economy also outside a bank run by pushing up
the spread between the return on wholesale loans and the return on deposits,
reducing the leverage capacity of shadow banks, and hence investment and
output. As in the models of Cole and Kehoe (2000) and Gertler and Kiyotaki
(2015), the state space of the economy can be divided into three zones: a
safe zone, where only the no-run equilibrium exists, a crisis zone with both
equilibria and a zone where only the run equilibrium exists. In the crisis zone,
which equilibrium actually occurs will be determined by a sunspot shock.
In comparative statics exercises, we show that our model captures the
following trade-off for retail bank capital requirements: On the positive side,
a higher capital requirement reduces the frequency and severity of banking
crises. Under a higher retail bank capital requirement, retail banks can use
the capital buffers they build during expansions to absorb liquidated assets of
shadow banks during the fire sales that occur after a run on the shadow banking
sector. This leads to an investment boom, which increases the liquidation price
of assets, which in turn reduces the liquidation loss of the retail banks in a run.
As the likelihood of a shadow bank run is positively related to this liquidation
loss, the probability of bank runs is reduced.
On the negative side, higher retail bank capital requirements lead to less
financial intermediation, an increase in the leverage of the shadow banking sec-
tor and a reallocation of assets from the retail to the shadow banking sector:
Intuitively, a higher retail bank capital requirement pushes up the financing
cost for retail banks, which is further passed through wholesale funding to
the shadow banks. This results in less financial intermediation and a higher
required return on capital, a lower aggregate capital stock, and eventually a
lower output of the economy. A reallocation of assets occurs whenever whole-
sale loans have a lower weight in the capital requirement of the retail banks
than retail loans.8 Consequently, the relative share of financial intermediation
conducted in the shadow banking sector will increase as the capital require-
8This is the empirically relevant case, since wholesale lending receives a lower risk weight
in the risk-weighted capital ratio of banks. An alternative interpretation would be that
retail banks can hide a fraction of their investments into shadow banks from the regulator
and the public.
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ment on retail banks increases, which in turn makes bank runs on the shadow
banking sector more costly.
As a first numerical exercise, we compute the welfare cost of bank runs. We
do this by eliminating the sunspot shock, such that the economy always ends
up in the no-run equilibrium, even when it is in the crisis zone. The welfare cost
of bank runs is large: households are willing to pay 1.7 percent in permanent
consumption equivalent units to eliminate bank runs. To understand better
why bank runs are costly, we decompose the total cost of runs in the cost of
bank run fears and the cost of realized bank runs. We do this by comparing an
economy, in which bank runs are anticipated, but never realize, to the baseline
economy with anticipated and realized bank runs. We find that most of the
welfare cost of bank runs stems from bank run fears: Even without realized
bank runs, the welfare gain from eliminating bank run fears is 1.4 percent in
consumption equivalent terms or about 80 percent of the total welfare gain.
The welfare cost of bank run fears stems from two sources: First, bank run
fears reduce the leverage capacity of shadow banks by reducing the value of
operating a shadow bank relative to the value of diverting assets. Moreover,
a higher fear of bank runs increases the cost of wholesale financing. Together,
these two effects reduce financial intermediation, hence the capital stock and
therefore output and consumption.
We second investigate the effects of retail and shadow bank capital require-
ments on financial stability and welfare. We investigate the effect of increasing
retail bank capital requirements from 10 to 12.5 percent. If this capital re-
quirement is lifted during a bank run, it reduces the frequency of bank runs
from 3 runs per 100 years to 2.8 runs per 100 years. The effectiveness of higher
retail bank capital requirements is so limited, since they lead to a spillover on
shadow banks: The leverage of shadow banks increases by 10.4 percent. This
spillover effect comes from two sources: First, retail banks shift from lending
on the retail lending market to the wholesale lending market, since the amount
of equity required per unit of lending on the retail market is higher than that
required on the wholesale market. Second, a lower risk of bank runs due to
tighter retail bank regulation increases the leverage capacity of shadow banks.
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This latter channel is unique to the model with anticipated banking crises. We
decompose the spillover effect into these two channels by comparing the effect
of imposing retail bank capital requirements in the model with and without
bank runs. We find that more than 60 percent of the spillover effect on shadow
banks is due to the latter, novel bank run effect.
Finally, we consider the quantitative importance of this spillover effect by
comparing the effects of a policy that only increases retail bank capital require-
ments to another policy that imposes the same retail bank capital requirement,
but additionally corrects for the spillover by imposing a capital requirement
on shadow banks such that shadow banks have the same leverage as in the
model without regulation. We find that the costs of the spillover effect are
quantitatively important: The policy that corrects for the spillover is more
than twice as effective at reducing the frequency and severity of bank runs
than the policy which does not do so.
Related Literature This paper is closely related to three strands of lit-
erature. The first literature incorporates shadow banks into macroeconomic
models. We build directly on the work of GKP, who develop a canonical
macroeconomic framework of financial crises in the form of shadow bank runs.
They extend Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015) by including a wholesale or shadow
banking sector, which played an important part in the onset of the 2007-09
financial crisis. We embed their model into a real business cycle model with en-
dogenous capital accumulation and productivity shocks to analyze the welfare
and financial stabilization effects of bank capital regulation.
Another paper which studies a similar research question to this paper is
Begenau and Landvoigt (2018). The authors study retail bank capital require-
ments in an economy with an unregulated external shadow banking sector and
endogenous capital accumulation. The key difference to their framework is the
flow of funds in the economy. In our model, households have direct access to
capital markets and there is a wholesale funding market that links the retail
and the shadow banking sector. In their model, households hold both debt and
equity of retail and shadow banks but have no access to the capital market,
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and there is no interbank market between the two banking sectors. Conse-
quently, the spillover effects of regulating retail bank capital on shadow bank
decisions are small in their model, but quite large in this model. They also
model bank runs, but the probability of a bank run is determined exogenously
and independently of the liquidation loss in their model.
There is also a set of papers that provides microfoundations for the role
of shadow banks in more stylized, theoretical models, e.g. Gennaioli et al.
(2013), Luck and Schempp (2016), Moreira and Savov (2017) and Chretien and
Lyonnet (2017). Farhi and Tirole (2017) provide a theoretical model of optimal
macroprudential regulation in the presence of shadow banks. Relatedly, there
is a theoretical literature that emphasizes the role of the shadow banking
system for regulatory arbitrage, for example Plantin (2015), Huang (2018)
and Ordon˜ez (2018).
Meeks et al. (2017) study the effects of the existence of a shadow banking
sector on the propagation of various macroeconomic shocks, including financial
shocks, but do not consider endogenous financial risk in the form of banking
crises. Ferrante (2018) presents a new channel through which shadow banks
endogenously affect the asset quality of the economy, which leads to business
cycle and banking crisis amplification. He does not consider bank capital
regulation.
There is a second literature which studies the causes and non-linear prop-
agation of severe financial crises in models with financial intermediation. The
closest paper to this paper is Gertler et al. (2017), which also introduces bank-
ing crises through into a macroeconomic model. A key distinction is that we
include both a retail and a shadow banking sector, which allows us to study
spillover effects of bank regulation. Moreover, we discuss the motive for and
welfare effects of bank capital regulation and compute the welfare cost of bank
runs. Other papers, which model banking crises as rollover crises driven by
sunspots, are Martin et al. (2014) and Paul (2018). There are other paper
which introduce financial crises in a different way, e.g. due to occasionally
binding borrowing constraints (Mendoza (2010), Bianchi (2011), He and Kr-
ishnamurthy (2012), Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014)) or due to market
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freezes (Boissay et al. (2016)).
The paper is also related to a third literature, which discusses macropru-
dential regulation. The results of our paper are related to Angeloni and Faia
(2013), who study the effectiveness of dynamic capital requirements in the
presence of bank runs. There are several differences: First, there are multiple
banking sectors in our model. This gives us a spillover effect of regulation
of retail banks on the shadow banking sector. Second, we consider runs on
the interbank market as opposed to depositor runs. Financial instability in
our model arises therefore for a different reason, and gives a different motive
to regulate retail banks. Third, banks in our model invest into long-lived as-
sets, which gives rise to systemic self-fulfilling crises through changes in asset
prices. In their model, runs are instead bank-specific runs of the Diamond and
Dybvig (1983)-type. Therefore, macroprudential policy can have additional
effects through affecting asset prices. Other papers have considered optimal
regulation in the presence of externalities that arise in general equilibrium, e.g.
Lorenzoni (2008), Bianchi and Mendoza (2018), Di Tella (2016) and Da´vila and
Korinek (2017). Relative to this literature, we study the effects of regulation
in the presence of heterogeneous intermediaries and an interbank market.
More generally, this paper builds on the literature that studies the role of
financial frictions as a driving force of financial crises. Early models include
Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). In these papers,
financial frictions are embedded in the financial structure of firms rather than
financial intermediaries.
Outline We proceed as follows: In section 2, we outline the model. We
characterize the equilibrium of the model in section 3. We present comparative
statics which describe the intended effects of retail bank capital regulation
and the unintended spillover effect on shadow bank leverage in section 4. We
calibrate the model and compare it to the data in section 5. Finally, we show
simulation results for the welfare cost of bank runs as well as the welfare effects
of bank capital regulation in section 6. Section 7 concludes.
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2 Model
In this section, we present a model with a detailed financial sector which is
based on GKP. The crucial feature of the model is a wholesale funding market,
where retail and shadow banks can make risky loans to each other. Moreover,
households and banks make retail loans to consumption goods producers. The
consumption goods producers use these loans to purchase capital from capital
producers. Households also lend on the deposit market to banks.
Time is discrete, with t = 0, 1, . . . ,∞. We follow the convention that lower
case letters for variables denote individual variables, while upper case letters
denote aggregate variables.
2.1 Banks
We begin with an exposition of the problem of a bank. The rest of the model
is quite standard.
2.1.1 Objective Function and Balance Sheet
Objective Function There is a unit measure of both retail banks (R-banks)
and shadow banks (S-banks) in the economy. All banks are owned by house-
holds. J-banks, J ∈ {R, S} maximize expected discounted payouts to house-
holds, which are given by
Et
[
T∑
s=t
Λt,t+s(1− σJ)s−t−1σJnJs
]
, (2.1)
where Et denotes the expectation conditional on time t information. σJ is an
exogenous exit probability and nJs is the net worth of the bank in period s.
Λt,t+s is the stochastic discount factor of the household between period t and
period t + s, defined in the household problem. T is the period in which the
bank defaults due to insolvency, with possibly T →∞. Intuitively, this payoff
function implies that banks accumulate net worth until they exit, in which
case they pay out their net worth to the households.
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Balance Sheet At time t, banks use deposit funding from households, dJt+1,
and their own net worth, nJt , to finance retail loans to the non-financial firms,
aJt+1. These retail loans are state-contingent and long-term and can be inter-
preted as direct claims to the capital stock of the non-financial firms.9 Hence,
these loans are valued at the market price of capital Qt. Banks incur a bank-
specific, linear loan servicing cost fJt for outstanding retail loans at the end
of period t. In addition, banks can borrow or lend on the wholesale funding
market, bJt+1. b
J
t+1 > 0 means that bank J lends on the wholesale funding
market, while bJt+1 < 0 denotes that bank J borrows on the wholesale funding
market. Hence, the balance sheet of a bank is given by
(Qt + f
J
t )a
J
t+1 + b
J
t+1 = d
J
t+1 + n
J
t (2.2)
Net Worth In period t, incumbent banks obtain a gross return on retail
loans issued in period t−1, RAt aJt . Banks also pay a gross return from borrow-
ing or receive a gross return from lending on the wholesale funding market,
xtR
B
t b
J
t . xt ≤ 1 denotes the fraction of the promised repayment on wholesale
funding that wholesale lenders receive. In a bank run, wholesale lenders receive
only a fraction of their return on wholesale lending, i.e. xt < 1. Otherwise
xt = 1. Banks repay R
D
t d
J
t to households for their deposits. A bank’s net
worth in period t is given by
nJt = R
A
t a
J
t + xtR
B
t b
J
t −RDt dJt . (2.3)
Loan Servicing Fee For the retail loans on their balance sheet at the end
of the period, banks and households have to pay a loan servicing cost. This
loan servicing cost can be interpreted as the cost of monitoring outstanding
loans. Households, retail banks and shadow banks have access to different loan
9In practice, banks’ lending to the non-financial sector is largely in the form of debt
rather than equity. In the context of our model, banks’ investment in the non-financial
sector takes the form of equity investment rather than debt. This is a common assumption
in the literature with financial intermediation for simplicity - otherwise another layer of
liability of the non-financial sector has to be added. Under the current assumption, default
on bank loans can be related to bankruptcy of the non-financial firms.
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servicing technologies. Loan servicing is provided by specialized firms which
operate in a competitive industry.10 These firms have a cost function that is
quadratically increasing in the total amount of loans serviced, A˜Jt+1. It is given
by
ηJ
(
A˜Jt+1
At
)2
At (2.4)
Loan servicing firms charge the banks a linear fee fJt for their service.
11 Re-
garding the cost of screening, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 1. Shadow banks have lower loan servicing costs than retail
banks. Households have the highest loan servicing costs: ηH > ηR > ηS = 0.
Adrian and Ashcraft (2012a) discuss reasons for the existence of shadow
bank credit intermediation in addition to retail bank credit intermediation.
They argue that securitization allowed shadow banks to reduce informational
frictions in credit markets, thereby being able to offer loans to high-risk credi-
tors which yield a superior return. Assuming that shadow banks have a lower
loan servicing cost than retail banks allows us to capture this salient fact in a
simple and tractable way.
Entry and Exit With probability σJ , a bank of type J receives an exit
shock. In the case of such a shock, the bank sells its assets, repays its liabilities
and exits the economy. To keep the measure of banks constant over time, new
banks with mass σJ enter the economy and receive an exogenous endowment
n˜Jt = υKt/σ
J from households.12 We make the following assumption regarding
the exit probability of retail and shadow banks:
10Such companies are for example appraisal management companies, which determine the
value of a property, or credit bureaus, which determine the credit worthiness of a household.
11This assumption is important for technical reasons. It ensures that the decision problem
of the retail banks is linear in their net worth. Therefore it is sufficient to characterize the
decision problem of a representative retail bank.
12We scale the endowment of newly entering banks by the capital stock to ensure that
the arguably stylized assumptions on entry do not affect the comparative statics through
changes in the relative size of the endowment.
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Assumption 2. The exit probability of retail banks is lower than the exit
probability of shadow banks, i.e. σR < σS.
This assumption is necessary to ensure that operating a R-bank is not
strictly worse than operating a S-bank: R-banks have higher lending costs,
but they can accumulate net worth for a longer period of time.13 Together,
Assumptions 1 and 2 capture in a simple way the idea that shadow banks
are opened to exploit specific investment opportunities and closed down again
when those investment opportunities vanish.
2.1.2 Financial Friction and Default
Moral Hazard Problem Banks can divert a fraction of their assets after
they have made their borrowing and lending decisions. How much they can
divert depends both on the type of assets and the financing of the assets.
Following GKP, we make the following assumptions regarding the diversion of
assets:
Assumption 3. A fraction
• ψ, 0 < ψ < 1, of equity or deposit financed retail loans,
• γψ, 0 < γ < 1, of equity or deposit financed wholesale loans, and
• ωψ, 0 < ω < 1, of wholesale funding financed retail loans
can be diverted.
Intuitively, retail loans are easier to divert than wholesale loans, and assets
financed through wholesale funding are harder to divert compared to those
financed by deposits or bank equity.14
13While we do not model the choice between operating a R-bank and a S-bank, this
assumption ensures that the relative size of the R-banking sector, which is endogenous, is
not too small.
14Diversion entails the liquidation of the banks’ assets and a subsequent default on credi-
tors. One way to justify why equity financed assets cannot be diverted fully is that diversion
creates a loss to the diverting bank which is equal to 1− ψ times the diverted assets. Since
banks utility is linear in consumption, such a cost may either be a pecuniary cost in the
form of a penalty or a stigmatic utility cost.
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We motivate ω < 1 by wholesale lenders having stronger incentives to
screen the investments of borrowers than depositors or shareholders.15 For γ <
1, the intuition lies in the higher standardization of wholesale loans compared
to retail loans.16
Incentive Constraint If a bank diverts assets, it will not repay its liabilities.
Its creditors will subsequently force the bank to exit the economy. Because
diversion occurs at the end of the period before the uncertainty about the
next period is resolved, an incentive constraint on the bank can ensure that
diversion will never occur in equilibrium. This incentive constraint states
that the benefit of diversion must be smaller or equal to the franchise value of
continuing to operate the bank. Denote this franchise value by V Jt . If the bank
lends on the wholesale funding market, i.e. bJt+1 > 0, the incentive constraint
is
ψ
[
(Qt + f
J
t )a
J
t+1 + γb
J
t+1
] ≤ V Jt . (2.5)
If the bank borrows on the wholesale funding market, i.e. bJt+1 ≤ 0, the
incentive constraint is instead
ψ
[
(Qt + f
J
t )a
J
t+1 + (1− ω)bJt+1
] ≤ V Jt , (2.6)
i.e. a fraction (1 − ω) of wholesale financed retail loans is excluded from
diversion.
15Adrian and Ashcraft (2012a) argue that due to deposit insurance, depositors have a
lower incentive to screen investments of the borrower than wholesale lenders who lend against
securitized assets. For the former, the implicit government guarantee provided by the Federal
Deposit Insurance is enough to ensure depositors that their lending is risk-free, whereas for
the latter, the riskiness of their lending depends on the diversification of the borrower.
16The collateral underlying for example a repo contract, which is a typical wholesale
lending instrument, was often a high quality government bond or a collateralized debt
obligation. Those assets were considered safe and their market value was easy to verify
for creditors (see e.g. Gorton and Metrick (2012)). The collateral underlying a retail loan
can for example be commercial real estate or the physical capital stock of a firm, for which
only a rough estimate of the market value exists. Hence, the potential for diversion is much
higher for retail loans compared to wholesale loans.
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Bank Default Equations 2.5 and 2.6 imply that a bank with zero or negative
net worth cannot lend or borrow. By the definition of bank net worth this
also means that the assets of the bank are insufficient to cover its liabilities:
nJt ≤ 0 ⇐⇒ RAt aJt + RBt bJt ≤ RDt dJt . Hence, a bank with a negative net
worth is insolvent and has to default on its liabilities. The creditors of the
bank recover a fraction ξ of the bank’s assets. If the bank borrows exclusively
from the wholesale funding market, i.e. dJt+1 = 0 and b
J
t+1 < 0, the recovery
rate is
xt = ξ
RAt a
J
t
|RBt bJt |
. (2.7)
If the bank is insolvent, the creditors do not recover their claim in full: nJt <
0 ⇒ xt < 1. The fraction 1 − ξ that is not recovered is rebated lump sum to
households.
2.1.3 Bank Leverage
Define the leverage ratio of a bank as
φJt ≡
(Qt + f
J
t )a
J
t+1 + γb
J
t+11(b
J
t+1 > 0)
nJt
, (2.8)
i.e. the fraction of bank assets that require some equity financing divided by
the net worth, or equity, of the bank. Remember that a fraction 1 − γ of
wholesale loans is non-divertable and hence does not require equity financing.
Define further ΩJt ≡ V
J
t
nJt
as the average market value of a unit of net worth.
Since the problem of the bank is linear in net worth, this corresponds to the
marginal value of an additional unit of net worth to a bank of type J .
With these definitions, we can rewrite equation 2.5 as
ψφJt ≤ ΩJt . (2.9)
Similarly, equation 2.6 can be rewritten as
ψ
[
ωφJt + 1− ω
] ≤ ΩJt . (2.10)
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Hence, the incentive constraint of a bank can be interpreted as a market-
imposed leverage constraint. It implies that the leverage of a bank that is at
the incentive constraint is linearly increasing in the value of an additional unit
of net worth.
2.1.4 Bank Capital Requirements
The regulator can impose a capital requirement, which is equivalent to an
upper bound on leverage:
φJt ≤ φ¯Jt . (2.11)
We consider a regulator that sets leverage constraints for banks of type J ,
φ¯Jt , following a modified leverage constraint:
ψφ¯Jt (1 + τ
J
t ) = Ω
J
t (2.12)
for lenders on the wholesale funding market, and
ψ
[
ωφ¯Jt (1 + τ
J
t ) + 1− ω
] ≤ ΩJt (2.13)
for borrowers on the wholesale funding market.
The interpretation of this constraint is that the regulator internalizes that
the social cost of an additional unit of bank leverage might be higher, by a
factor τJt , than its private cost. This is the case, since an increase in leverage
leads to higher debt in the economy, which increases the likelihood and severity
of a systemic shadow bank run.
2.2 Households
Preferences Households maximize utility from consumption. Their utility
function is given by
Et
[ ∞∑
s=t
βs−tU(cHs )
]
, (2.14)
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where β is the discount factor of the household. cHt denotes household con-
sumption in period t. U(c) is the current utility function of the household,
with U ′(c) > 0, U ′′(c) < 0, and satisfying the Inada conditions.
The stochastic discount factor of the household between period t and t+ s
is given by
Λt,t+s = β
s−tU
′(cHt+s)
U ′(cHt )
.
Household Budget Constraint Households consume, invest in retail loans
aHt+1 and make deposits d
H
t+1 at banks. They supply one unit of labor inelasti-
cally and receive Wt as labor income. In addition, they own the banks, capital
producers and loan servicing firms and receive their profits Πt.
17 Deposits
yield a safe gross return RDt+1 in the subsequent period. The net worth of the
household at the beginning of period t is given by
nHt = R
A
t a
H
t +R
D
t d
H
t +Wt + Πt. (2.15)
The budget constraint of the household is
cHt + d
H
t+1 + (Qt + f
H
t )a
H
t+1 = n
H
t . (2.16)
Loan Servicing Firms Banks and households pay a linear fee fJt to the
loan servicing companies. The profit of these firms is given by:
ΠL,Jt = f
J
t A˜
J
t+1 −
ηJ
2
(
A˜Jt+1
At
)2
At
where fJt is the loan servicing fee per unit of the loan. These firms are owned
by the households. They operate in a competitive market, which means the
equilibrium fee fJt is taken as given by households and banks, and is determined
in equilibrium such that the loan servicing firms are willing to service all loans
of the banks and households.
17Profits are 0 in steady state, but may arise outside of the steady state due to a quadratic
capital adjustment cost.
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2.3 Production
2.3.1 Consumption Goods Producers
Consumption goods producers use a Cobb-Douglas production technology that
takes labor Lt and capital Kt as input:
Yt = ZtK
α
t L
1−α
t . (2.17)
The price of the consumption good is normalized to one. Productivity Zt
follows an AR(1) process with mean µZ , persistence ρZ and volatility σZ :
ln(Zt) = (1− ρZ)µZ + ρZ ln(Zt−1) + σZt, (2.18)
where |ρZ | < 1 and t ∼ N(0, 1).
The consumption goods producers own the capital stock. Capital accumu-
lation follows the standard law of motion
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + It,
with depreciation rate δ and investment It.
The consumption goods producers use labor from households and their own
capital to produce final goods. They finance their capital Kt+1 exclusively
using retail loans At+1, which yields their balance sheet condition:
Kt+1 = At+1. (2.19)
They maximize profits taking the aggregate wage Wt, the return on loans R
A
t
and the price of capital Qt as given:
max
{Ls,Ks+1,As+1}∞s=t
Et
[ ∞∑
s=t
Λt,t+sΠs
]
(2.20)
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subject to
Πt = ZtK
α
t L
1−α
t −WtLt −Qt(Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt) +QtAt+1 −RAt At,
Kt+1 = At+1.
The first order conditions of the final goods producers’ problem determine the
wage and the state-contingent return on retail loans in equilibrium:
Wt = (1− α)ZtKαt L−αt , (2.21)
RAt+1 = αZt+1K
α−1
t+1 L
1−α
t+1 + (1− δ)Qt+1. (2.22)
2.3.2 Capital Goods Producers
Capital producers use a technology which transforms I˜t units of consumption
goods into Isupplyt units of capital goods. They face a convex cost function:
I˜t = I
supply
t +
θ
2
(
Isupplyt
Kt
− δ
)2
Kt, (2.23)
Therefore, the relative price of capital goods Qt is endogenous. Importantly,
the cost function is scaled by the aggregate capital stock Kt, which the capital
producers take as given.
Due to the convex cost function, the capital producers may earn non-zero
profits outside the steady state. They are owned by the households and any
profits or losses are transferred to the households each period.
The capital producers’ problem can be summarized as:
max
{Isupplys }∞
s=t
Et
[ ∞∑
s=t
Λt,t+sΠ
Q
s
]
(2.24)
subject to
ΠQt = QtI
supply
t − Isupplyt −
θ
2
(
Isupplyt
Kt
− δ
)2
Kt.
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The first order condition of the capital producer yields an expression for the
capital price:
Qt = 1 + θ
(
Isupplyt
Kt
− δ
)
. (2.25)
2.4 Aggregation and Market Clearing
2.4.1 Aggregation
There is no idiosyncratic uncertainty for households, such that we can con-
sider the problem of a representative household. Moreover, since the policy
functions of an individual bank are linear in net worth, we will characterize
the equilibrium in terms of the aggregate decisions of the banking sectors. Ag-
gregate variables are denoted by capital letters. The aggregate net worth of
the retail and shadow banking sector is given by the sum of the net worth of
incumbent and newly entering banks:
NJt =
(
RAt A
J
t +R
B
t B
J
t −RDt DJt
)
(1− σJ) + υKt
Aggregate profits are given by the profits of screening firms and capital pro-
ducers, plus the sum of net worth of exiting retail banks and shadow banks
minus the net worth of entering banks:
Πt = Π
Q
t + σ
RnRt + σ
SnSt + Π
L,H
t + Π
L,R
t − 2υKt (2.26)
Aggregate output is given by production net of the capital holding costs:
Yt = ZtK
α
t −
ηH
2
(
KHt+1
Kt
)2
Kt − η
R
2
(
KRt+1
Kt
)2
Kt. (2.27)
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2.4.2 Market Clearing
The markets for retail loans, labor, deposits, wholesale loans, investment and
loan services have to clear:
At+1 = A
H
t+1 + A
R
t+1 + A
S
t+1 (2.28)
Lt = 1 (2.29)
DHt+1 = D
R
t+1 +D
S
t+1 (2.30)
0 = BRt+1 +B
S
t+1 (2.31)
It = I
supply
t (2.32)
AJt+1 = A˜
J
t+1, J ∈ {H,R} (2.33)
Since there is a representative household, the individual consumption and
aggregate consumption are equal, cHt = C
H
t . Household consumption can be
inferred from the aggregate resource constraint:
CHt = Yt − I˜t (2.34)
3 Equilibrium and Bank Runs
In this section, we define the recursive competitive equilibrium. We character-
ize the flow of funds in the no-bank-run equilibrium and show how it depends
on the financial constraints of retail and shadow banks. We illustrate the
potential for multiple equilibria, namely one equilibrium with solvent banks
and high capital prices and one with insolvent shadow banks and low capital
prices.
3.1 Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
We consider a recursive competitive equilibrium. The aggregate state of the
economy is given by St = (NRt , NSt , Kt, Zt,Ξt). Ξt is a sunspot shock which can
take on two values, 0 and 1. It coordinates agents on the bank run equilibrium
if it takes the value 1 and on the no-bank run equilibrium otherwise. The
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equilibrium is a set of price functions Q(S), RA(S), RD(S), RB(S), W(S),
fH(S) and fR(S), value functions and policy functions for
• retail banks, ΩR(S),AR(S),DR(S),BR(S), which maximize 2.1 subject
to 2.2, 2.3 and 2.5,
• shadow banks, ΩS(S),AS(S),DS(S),BS(S), which maximize 2.1 sub-
ject to 2.2, 2.3 and 2.6,
• households, VH(S),CH(S),AH(S),DH(S), which maximize 2.14 sub-
ject to 2.15 and 2.16,
policy functions for
• final goods producers, K(S),A(S),L(S), that solve 2.20
• capital producers, Isupply(S), that solves 2.24 and
• loan service providers, A˜H(S) and A˜R(S),
and perceived laws of motion for the aggregate state G(S) that ensure that
the perceived law of motion for the aggregate state corresponds to its actual
law of motion:
St+1 = G(St), (3.1)
clear the markets specified in equations 2.28 to 2.33 satisfy the aggregate
resource constraint 2.34.
3.2 The Equilibrium with Solvent Shadow Banks
Figure 2 shows an overview of the equilibrium balance sheet of the economy.
Households are the ultimate lenders and have only equity on the liability side
of their balance sheets. They own all banks and firms. Not displayed is their
ownership of capital producers and loan servicing firms. Households lend to
retail banks and to consumption goods producers. Retail banks use deposits
and equity to lend to both shadow banks and consumption goods producers.
Shadow banks in turn use wholesale funding and their own equity to lend to
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Figure 2: The equilibrium flow of funds of the economy in the no-bank run state.
consumption goods producers, which are the ultimate borrowers. They fund
capital by using state-contingent claims to the capital stock which we call
retail loans.
To understand how this equilibrium depends on model assumptions, we
consider in Appendix C three instructive cases: A situation in which nei-
ther retail nor shadow banks are financially constrained, a situation in which
shadow banks are financially constrained, but retail banks are not, and a sit-
uation in which both types of banks are financially constrained.
3.3 The Equilibrium with Insolvent Shadow Banks
Assumptions We consider only runs on the shadow banking sector, and
only on the shadow banking sector as a whole. If such a run happens, the
assets of the shadow banks are liquidated at the liquidation price
Q∗t ≡ Q(NR(Q∗t ), NSt (Q∗t ), Kt, Zt,Ξt = 1).
The retail banks recover the assets of the shadow banks instead of their lending
at the recovery rate x∗t . Incumbent shadow banks exit once their assets are
liquidated. There is no entry of new shadow banks for the duration of the
bank run.
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Effect on the Capital Price If shadow banks are insolvent, their demand
for assets is zero. Moreover, the reduction of net worth due to the losses on
their wholesale loans reduces the asset demand of retail banks. This, together
with the fact that they are less efficient lenders than shadow banks anyway
implies that not all liquidated assets of shadow banks will be absorbed by
retail banks. This reduces the overall asset and capital demand and hence the
market price of capital Q∗t .
3.4 Equilibrium Multiplicity and Sunspots
Bank Run Condition There can be multiple equilibria in the model. In
other words, bank runs can be self-fulfilling. In that case, the market price
of capital deteriorates in anticipation of a bank run. This weakens balance
sheets of shadow banks so much that they cannot repay their liabilities. As
a consequence, it is optimal for the retail banks to run on shadow banks.
However, the bad equilibrium will only occur if the assets of the shadow banks,
valued at the liquidation price of capital, are insufficient to cover the liabilities
of shadow banks. Define
x(St) ≡ ξR
A(St)aSt
RBt b
S
t
.
Define further
xt ≡ x(NR(Qt), NS(Qt), Kt, Zt,Ξt = 0),
and
x∗t ≡ x(NR(Q∗t ), NS(Q∗t ), Kt, Zt,Ξt = 1).
Then, depending on the state of the economy, there can be three situations:
First, if xt > 1 and x
∗
t > 1, the economy is in the safe zone, where even
conditional on a sunspot shock, the bank run equilibrium will not arise. If
xt > 1 and x
∗
t ≤ 1, the economy is in the crisis zone, where it is susceptible
to bank runs. If xt ≤ 1 and x∗t ≤ 1, shadow banks will default for sure,
independently of the sunspot.
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Sunspots The probability of a shadow bank run is given by
pt ≡ Pr(Ξt = 1)1(x∗t ≤ 1), (3.2)
where 1(x∗t ≤ 1) is an indicator function that takes the value 1 if x∗t ≤ 1
and 0 otherwise. Ξt is a sunspot that determines how likely a bank run is,
conditional on the bank run condition being fulfilled. In the baseline model,
we assume that the bank run probability is i.i.d. and inversely related to the
recovery value of bank creditors in default. Formally,
Pr(Ξt = 1) = η(1− x∗t ).
Note that the bank run probability is endogenous for two reasons. First,
the probability of the sunspot shock depends on an endogenous object, x∗t .
Second, the crisis zone where both equilibria exist depends also on x∗t . As a
consequence, bank runs in this model are driven by fundamentals and not pure
sunspot events.18
3.5 The Effects of Bank Run Risk on Leverage
Figure 3 shows that the existence of the bank run equilibrium substantially
changes the optimal policies of shadow banks in the no-run equilibrium. It
depicts the leverage policy of shadow banks in the no-run equilibrium as a
function of shadow bank net worth, holding all other state variables at their
steady state value. We show the policy functions for two situations: The blue,
solid line depicts the policy function if bank runs are anticipated, the red,
dashed line if they are unanticipated.
If bank runs are anticipated, the leverage capacity of shadow banks is
much lower. To see why this is the case, consider the incentive constraint of
18Gorton (1988) presents evidence that historically, bank runs in the United States were
indeed related to an increased fundamental riskiness of deposits, that is, during times when
expected losses on deposits were high. Further, the large number of retail banks in an
economy and the high competition in the retail banking business reduces the ability of
banks to coordinate absent, for example, a credible lender of last resort (Rochet and Vives
(2004)).
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Figure 3: The policy function for shadow bank leverage φSt in the no-run equilibrium
in the baseline model as a function of shadow bank net worth. The other state
variables are held constant at the steady state level. With Runs denotes the policy
function in the case of anticipated bank runs. No Runs denotes the policy function
if bank runs are unanticipated or if the crisis equilibrium is ruled out.
the shadow bank:
ψ(ωφSt + 1− ω) = ΩSt
= Et
Λt,t+1
σS + (1− σS) ΩSt+1︸︷︷︸
Effect on Future
Continuation
Value
 n
S
t+1
nSt︸︷︷︸
Effect on
Net Worth
Growth
(1− pt+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Direct
Effect
 .
An increase in bank run risk (i.e., in pt+1) can affect the leverage capacity of
shadow banks through three channels: First, it directly lowers the continuation
value. Second, it can lower the leverage capacity of shadow banks indirectly by
lowering future capital prices and hence net worth growth. Third, it can affect
the current continuation value by lowering lower future continuation values
through lowering future leverage capacity. Overall, the incentive constraint
delivers some form of ”market prudence”: Higher bank run risk will lead to
lower leverage capacity of shadow banks.
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4 The Intended and Unintended Effects of Reg-
ulating Retail Banks
In the last section, we showed how bank runs in the model work and demon-
strated that they are costly events. In this section, we introduce regulation in
the form of leverage constraints for retail and shadow banks into the model
and investigate their effectiveness in reducing the frequency of shadow bank
runs.
4.1 Retail Bank Capital Requirements
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Figure 4: Policy functions for the expected bank run probability (top left), the
expected return on capital (top right), retail bank leverage (bottom left) and shadow
bank leverage (bottom right) as a function of retail bank net worth NRt . All other
states are held constant at their steady state value. Baseline denotes the policy
functions for the model without regulation, Regulation those for the model with a
retail bank capital requirement such that τRNoRun = 0.5.
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We show the effects of higher retail bank capital requirements in Figure
4. In this figure, we plot the next period bank run probability Et [pt+1], the
expected future return on capital Et
[
RAt+1
Qt
]
, and both retail bank leverage φRt
and shadow bank leverage φSt as a function of the net worth of retail banks
NRt . We keep all other state variables at their steady state value. We show
two situations: The baseline model, in which there is no regulation, is the
blue, solid line. The red, dashed line depicts the policy functions in a model in
which the regulator increases capital requirements by imposing τRNoRun = 0.5.
We set τRRun = 0, so that in the run equilibrium, the market imposed leverage
constraint and the regulatory leverage constraint coincide.
We see that the introduction of the retail bank capital requirement reduces
the expected future probability of bank runs substantially. To understand
why, consider the existence condition for the bank run equilibrium. After
substituting Qta
S
t+1 = φ
S
t n
S
t and b
S
t+1 = (φ
S
t − 1)nSt , this becomes:
x∗t = ξ
RA∗t+1
Qt
RBt+1
φSt
φSt − 1
≤ 1. (4.1)
There are two terms: The first one is the spread between the return on shadow
bank assets in the case of a shadow bank run, the second is decreasing in the
leverage of shadow banks. Inspecting the last three panels of Figure 4, we can
see that the effect of higher retail bank capital requirements on the expected
future bank run probability stems from an increase in the expected future
return on capital: By constraining the leverage capacity of retail banks in
the no-run-equilibrium, the regulator increases the leverage capacity of retail
banks in the run-equilibrium, which leads them to invest more and pushes up
the liquidation price of capital in the run equilibrium.
However, we can see in the bottom right panel that imposing retail bank
capital requirements has a strong spillover on shadow bank leverage. This
spillover occurs for two reasons: First, as the policy reduces the probability of
a shadow bank run, it relaxes the incentive constraint of shadow banks, which
increases their leverage capacity. Second, as γ < 1, that is, as wholesale loans
enter with a lower weight in the leverage constraint of retail banks than retail
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loans, a tighter leverage constraint induces retail banks to shift their relative
portfolio shares away from retail lending and towards wholesale lending. Look-
ing at the bank run existence condition 4.1, we can see that a higher shadow
bank run leverage counteracts the increase in the return on capital and hence
reduces the effectiveness of the retail bank capital requirement policy.
These spillover effects are consistent with the empirical evidence: For exam-
ple, Duca (2016) provides evidence that the share of assets funded by shadow
banks is higher if event risks on the interbank market are lower and the regu-
lation of banks relative to nonbanks was tighter.
4.2 Correcting the Spillover Effect
To understand the importance of the spillover effect better, we show in Figure 5
a policy that corrects for the spillover effect of retail bank capital requirements
on shadow bank leverage. This policy imposes both a retail and a shadow
bank capital requirement. We choose τRNoRun = 0.5 and τ
R
Run = 0 as before,
but now additionally set τS ≈ 0.11. We choose τS such that the average
level of shadow bank leverage in model simulations is equal in the model with
and without regulation. The dotted, black lines depict the policy functions
in the case of this retail bank capital requirement with spillover correction
as a function of retail bank net worth. As before, the solid blue line is the
baseline case without regulation, the dashed red line the case with retail bank
regulation, but without spillover correction.
We can see in the top left panel of Figure 5 that, due to the spillover correc-
tion, the retail bank capital requirement is almost twice as effective at reduc-
ing the expected future probability of shadow bank runs as without spillover
correction. Moreover, there is no substantial feedback from the spillover cor-
rection to either retail bank leverage or the expected return on capital, as we
see in the top right and bottom left panel. Taken together, this shows that the
negative spillover lowers the effectiveness of retail bank capital requirements
in reducing the frequency of shadow bank runs dramatically.
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Figure 5: Policy functions for the expected bank run probability (top left), the
expected return on capital (top right), retail bank leverage (bottom left) and shadow
bank leverage (bottom right) as a function of retail bank net worth NRt . All other
states are held constant at their steady state value. Baseline denotes the policy
functions for the model without regulation, With Regulation denotes those for the
model with a retail bank capital requirement such that τRNoRun = 0.5. With Spillover
Correction denotes the policy functions for the model where there are a both retail
and shadow bank capital requirement, with τRNoRun = 0.5 and τ
S ≈ 0.11.
5 Calibration
We solve the model numerically to illustrate the effects of bank run risk on
the distribution of output in model simulations, as well as to illustrate the
effectiveness of retail bank capital regulation and the quantitative importance
of the novel spillover effect.
5.1 Calibration Strategy
Overall, there are 18 parameters to calibrate. Since we solve a complicated
non-linear model, estimating all parameters is infeasible. We therefore divide
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the parameters into three blocks. Parameters in the first block include the
technology and preference parameters. We use conventional values for those
parameters. The second block of parameters are those for the financial sector.
We set them to match steady state moments of the model to the data. We
take the targets which we calibrate to from GKP. These targets are credit
spreads as well as data from the financial accounts of the US. The third block
of parameters are specific to bank runs or specify the exogenous stochastic
processes. We internally calibrate those parameters using moment matching.
Role Name Value Target or Source
(a) Technology and Preferences
Capital share in production α 0.36 Standard value
Depreciation Rate δ 0.025 Standard value
Risk Aversion σ 2 Standard value
Household discount factor β 0.9902 RD − 1 = 4% p.a.
Capital adjustment cost θ 10 ∂ ln(Qt)
∂ ln(It)
∣∣∣ = 0.25
(b) Financial Sector
Banks’ initial equity υ 0.001 Planning horizons of banks
Diversion benefit of wholesale lending γ 0.6676 RB −RD = 0.8% p.a.
Household capital holding cost ηH 0.0286 RK −RD = 2.4% p.a.
Retail bank capital holding cost ηR 0.0071 RK,R −RD = 1.2% p.a.
Retail bank exit rate σR 0.0521 KR/K = 0.4
Shadow bank exit rate σS 0.1273 KS/K = 0.4
Asset diversion share ψ 0.2154 φR = 10
Diversion benefit of wholesale funding ω 0.5130 φS = 20
(c) Bank Runs and Stochastic Processes
Autocorrelation, productivity ρZ 0.9 ρ(Yt, Yt−1) = 0.9
Standard Deviation, productivity shock σZ 0.01 σ(Yt) = 0.03
Loss in Default ξ 0.9 Retail bank net worth in run -30 %
Sunspot probability shifter η 0.25 Crisis freq. of ≈ 0.75% per quarter
Reentry probability after bank run pi 12/13 Runs last 3.25 yrs on avg
Table 1: Calibration.
Technology and Preferences. Parameters in Panel (a) of Table 1 are set
following the literature. The capital share of consumption good production
α and the quarterly depreciation rate of capital δ are set to 0.36 and 0.025,
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respectively. We assume a risk aversion σ of the households of 2. These are
standard values in the literature. We set the discount rate of households β
to target an annual steady state return on deposits of 4 percent. We set the
adjustment cost parameter θ to match an elasticity of the capital price to
the investment-to-capital ratio of 0.25, which is the target of Bernanke et al.
(1999). This implies a parameter of θ = 10.19
Financial Sector. Parameters in Panel (b) of Table 1 are specific to the
financial sector. We use the same targets for these parameters as GKP. We
set the banks endowments υ to yield a planning horizon of shadow banks
of about two years and retail banks of about five years, similar to Gertler
et al. (2016).20 We target leverage ratios of 10 and 20 for retail banks and
shadow banks, respectively, to calibrate the diversion parameters ψ and ω.
This corresponds to the leverage ratios of depository institutions and broker
dealers before the crisis.21 We choose the remaining diversion parameter γ to
match an average annualized spread between the return on wholesale loans
and the return on deposits of 0.8 percent per year. We set the exit shock
probabilities σR and σS such that the share of assets intermediated by retail
banks and shadow banks in steady state are respectively 40 percent. These
values correspond to the respective share of intermediated assets in the data
between 2003 and 2007.22 For the capital holding cost parameters ηH and ηR,
we target spreads between the return on retail loans intermediated by shadow
banks and the deposit rate of 2.4 % per year and between the return on retail
loans intermediated by retail banks and the deposit rate of 1.2 percent per
year.
19The elasticity of the capital price to investment is given by ∂Qt∂It
It
Qt
= θ 1Kt
It
1+θ( ItKt−δ)
.
Evaluated in Steady State, this expression becomes θδ.
20The planning horizons are simply 1/σR and 1/σS . These are the same targets for the
banks endowment as in Gertler and Karadi (2011).
21See e.g. Gertler et al. (2016) or Ferrante (2018).
22According to GKP, assets intermediated by retail banks comprise equity of non-financial
firms, bonds, commercial paper, household and non-financial firm loans, mortgages and
consumer credit. For shadow banks, intermediated assets comprise equity of non-financial
firms, mortgages and consumer credit.
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Bank Runs and Stochastic Processes. We calibrate the parameters in
Panel (c) of Table 1 using moment matching. We choose ρZ and σZ to match
roughly the conditional volatility and the autocorrelation of detrended GDP
for the United States. Three key parameters for the cost of bank runs are the
loss on the recovery value in a run ξ, the sunspot probability shifter η and the
persistence of the run pi. We choose the persistence of financial crises such that
the average length of a financial crisis is 3.25 years, which matches the length
of a typical financial crisis in the database of Laeven and Valencia (2012).
We calibrate the sunspot probability shifter η to match an annual frequency
of bank runs of 3 percent or one bank run every 33 years, also in line with
Laeven and Valencia (2012). We choose the loss on the recovery value in a run
to match an average decrease of retail bank net worth conditional on a bank
run of 30 percent. This corresponds to the cutoff used in Baron et al. (2018)
to define a bank equity crash.
5.2 Solution Method
We solve the model nonlinearly with a projection method on a sparse grid. To
construct the sparse grid, we use the toolbox of Judd et al. (2014). Solving
the model using global methods has two key advantages: First, and most im-
portantly, it allows us to accurately characterize the dynamics of the economy
very far away from steady state. This is important, since a financial crisis
will wipe out the net worth of the shadow banking sector and substantially
reduce the net worth of the retail banking sector below its steady state level.
Second, the non-linear solution allows us to accurately compute risk premia in
the model. This is crucial, since asset price dynamics are key for generating
financial crises in the model. Details of the solution algorithm are in Appendix
D.
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6 Quantitative Results
We conduct three counterfactual experiments. First, we compare how the
existence of the bank run equilibrium affects the economy. This experiment
gives us an idea of the cost of bank runs and hence an upper bound on the
positive effect of a policy designed to reduce bank runs. We find that the
welfare cost of bank runs is large. We decompose the total effect of shadow
bank runs into the effect that is due to realized bank runs, and the effect that
is due to financial crisis fears. We show that it is the latter channel which
is the more important one. Second, we consider the effects of retail bank
capital requirements. We show that there is a substantial spillover effect from
retail bank capital requirements on shadow bank leverage. We decompose the
effect into an effect that is due to a relaxation of the shadow bank incentive
constraint and one that is due to the portfolio reallocation of retail banks.
Third, we consider a policy that corrects for the spillover effect by imposing
a shadow bank capital requirement that offsets the increase in leverage in
addition to the retail bank capital requirement. We show that the retail bank
capital requirement would be more than twice as effective in reducing the
frequency of shadow bank runs without the spillover effect.
6.1 The Effects of Bank Run (Fears) on the Level and
Volatility of Output
Before investigating the welfare effects of bank capital requirements, we want
to know how costly bank runs are in our calibrated model. For this purpose, we
conduct the following experiment: We first simulate 10000 model economies
for 2000 periods and discard the first 1000 periods in the model with bank
runs. Moments from this simulation are reported in column 1 of Table 2. We
compute welfare in consumption equivalent units using the realized consump-
tion of households. Next, we simulate the model without bank runs. For this
simulation, we re-solve the model and set the expected probability of a sunspot
shock to 0. The results are reported in column 2 of Table 2.
Comparing the models with and without bank runs, we can see that bank
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With Runs No Runs Only Exp.
Macroeconomic Aggregates
Mean, Output (Y ) 1.088 1.114 1.093
Mean, Consumption (CH) 0.850 0.865 0.853
Mean, Investment (I˜) 0.238 0.248 0.240
St. Dev., Output (Y ) 3.181 3.275 3.192
St. Dev., Consumption (CH) 2.169 2.197 2.162
St. Dev., Investment (I˜) 7.396 7.614 7.421
Financial Sector
Mean, Retail Bank Leverage (φR) 10.291 10.019 10.239
Mean, Shadow Bank Leverage (φS) 13.444 19.995 13.244
Asset Prices
Mean, Spread, Wholesale (RB
′ −RD′) 1.119 0.757 1.083
Mean, Spread, Retail (E[RK
′
/Q]−RD′) 2.990 2.505 2.862
Bank Runs
Runs per 100 Years 3.100 0.000 0.000
Recovery Rate (xt|Runt) 78.214 - -
Welfare 0.850 0.865 0.853
Table 2: The macroeconomic effects of bank runs. Results are from a simulation of
10000 economies for 2000 periods, discarding the first 1000 periods. With Runs is
the baseline model with anticipated bank runs. No Runs is a version of the model
in which bank runs neither happen nor are expected to happen. Only Exp. shows
the results for a model in which bank runs are expected to happen, but never occur.
runs have severe effects on the first and second moments of macroeconomic
aggregates: With bank runs, output, consumption and investment are sub-
stantially lower. The effect is sizeable: Even though bank runs occur only
once every 33 years on average, output is on average by 2.3 percent lower
in every period. Consumption is by 1.7 percent lower, investment even by 4
percent.
Surprisingly, the unconditional volatility of the economy is lower if there
are bank runs. This is because in the presence of bank run risk, the leverage
of shadow banks is much lower, which reduces the strength of the feedback
between banks balance sheets and the real economy. The reason that shadow
bank leverage is much lower is that with anticipated bank runs, the continu-
ation value of operating a shadow bank is lower, which makes the incentive
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constraint tighter. We can see that the decline in shadow bank leverage is sub-
stantial - from 20 to about 13.4. In contrast, retail banks see a relaxation of
their incentive constraint due to a higher excess return on retail and wholesale
lending, which increases their leverage capacity slightly. The welfare gain from
eliminating bank runs is a substantial 1.7 percent in permanent consumption
equivalent units.
We also want to investigate to what extent the effects of bank runs are
driven by pure anticipation effects as opposed to by actual runs occurring.
For that purpose, we simulate the model with anticipated bank runs, but
without any realized bank runs. For this simulation, we use the solution of
the model with anticipated bank runs, but set the probability that a sunspot
occurs in the simulation to 0. The results are reported in column 3 of Table 2.
Comparing columns 1 and 3, we can see that most of the effects of bank
runs seem to stem from bank run fears, since the economies look very similar
with or without realized bank runs. In particular, shadow bank leverage is
even lower without realized bank runs. Eliminating bank run fears leads to a
welfare gain of 1.4 percent in permanent consumption equivalent units or 80
percent of the total welfare gain from eliminating bank runs.
6.2 Retail Bank Capital Requirements with Spillover
Effects
We consider a retail bank capital requirement that is only imposed if the
economy is in the no-run state, i.e. τRNoRun = 0.5, τ
R
Run = 0. Such a requirement
has the advantage that the regulator can impose higher equity buffers of retail
banks during normal times, which can be used to absorb the liquidated capital
from shadow banks during a run, thereby pushing up the liquidation price of
capital. In this sense, the more access to deposits retail banks have during a
banking crisis, the higher the fire sale price of the capital will be ex post, and
the less likely bank runs would happen ex ante. Therefore, the optimal capital
requirement in face of a bank run is its lower bound, i.e. zero. In what follows
we focus on this specific run-contingent capital requirement.
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With Runs No Runs
Baseline τR = 0.5 Baseline τR = 0.5
Macroeconomic Aggregates
Mean, Output (Y ) 1.088 1.082 1.114 1.101
Mean, Consumption (CH) 0.850 0.848 0.865 0.860
Mean, Investment (I˜) 0.238 0.234 0.248 0.240
St. Dev., Output (Y ) 3.185 3.204 3.279 3.302
St. Dev., Consumption (CH) 2.174 2.245 2.203 2.249
St. Dev., Investment (I˜) 7.395 7.387 7.613 7.652
Financial Sector
Mean, Retail Bank Leverage (φR) 10.291 8.057 10.019 7.571
Mean, Shadow Bank Leverage (φS) 13.444 14.847 19.993 20.820
Asset Prices
Mean, Spread, Wholesale (RB
′ −RD′) 1.119 1.335 0.756 1.146
Mean, Spread, Retail (E[RK
′
/Q]−RD′) 2.990 3.195 2.504 2.877
Bank Runs
Runs per 100 Years 3.096 2.899 0.000 0.000
Recovery Rate (xt|Runt) 78.212 78.725 - -
Welfare 0.850 0.848 0.865 0.860
Table 3: The macroeconomic effects of tighter retail bank capital requirements.
Results are from a simulation of 10000 economies for 2000 periods, discarding the
first 1000 periods. With Runs is the baseline model with anticipated bank runs. No
Runs is a version of the model in which bank runs neither happen nor are expected
to happen.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 report the results. For τR = 0.5, retail bank
leverage decreases on average by about 21 percent from 10 to about 8. This
is because the increase in τRNoRun is partially offset by an increase in asset
returns, which increases the leverage capacity of retail banks. In terms of
looking at the macroeconomic aggregates, a retail bank capital requirement is
not a good policy: It reduces output on average by tightening the constraints
of the financial intermediaries and it increases the volatility of output.
This is because while retail bank leverage is lower with the regulatory
policy, shadow bank leverage increases substantially. This counteracts the ef-
fectiveness of the retail bank capital requirement in reducing the frequency and
severity of financial crises: While we can see that the frequency of bank runs
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decreases somewhat and the recovery rate of creditors increases, the overall
effect is not very large.
To understand how much of the spillover is due to the relaxation of the
shadow bank incentive constraint due to the lower bank run risk, and how much
is due to the portfolio reallocation of retail banks, we consider the effects of the
same bank capital requirement in an economy in which there are no bank runs.
Hence, in that economy, the first spillover channel does not exist. Columns 3
and 4 of Table 3 report the results.
In welfare terms, higher retail bank capital requirements reduce welfare
despite reducing the frequency of bank runs. This is since capital requirements
reduce the steady state capital stock, which lowers the steady state level of
consumption.
6.3 Retail Bank Capital Requirements without Spillover
Effects
In the last section, we established that retail bank capital requirements lead
to a spillover effect on shadow bank leverage, which reduces the effectiveness
of the policy. In this section, we aim to quantify by how much this spillover
reduces the effect of the policy quantitatively. For this purpose, we compare
two counterfactual policies: The first one corresponds to the retail bank capital
requirement in the last section. We call this counterfactual regulation with
spillover. We report the results from simulations of this model in Table 4,
column 2. In the second counterfactual, the regulator imposes the same capital
requirement on retail banks and levies an additional capital requirement on
shadow banks such that their leverage corresponds on average to their leverage
in the baseline model. We call this the regulation without spillover. The results
are reported in Table 4, column 3. For comparison, we report results for the
baseline model without regulation in Table 4, column 1.
We can see that the regulation without spillover is more than twice as ef-
fective in reducing the frequency and severity of bank runs than the regulation
with spillover: The frequency of bank runs decreases by about 0.5 bank runs
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With Runs
Baseline Regulation Regulation
W Spillover W/O Spillover
Macroeconomic Aggregates
Mean, Output (Y ) 1.088 1.082 1.079
Mean, Consumption (CH) 0.850 0.848 0.846
Mean, Investment (I˜) 0.238 0.234 0.232
St. Dev., Output (Y ) 3.184 3.202 3.179
St. Dev., Consumption (CH) 2.172 2.243 2.227
St. Dev., Investment (I˜) 7.398 7.387 7.351
Financial Sector
Mean, Retail Bank Leverage (φR) 10.291 8.057 8.033
Mean, Shadow Bank Leverage (φS) 13.444 14.847 13.436
Asset Prices
Mean, Spread, Wholesale (RB
′ −RD′) 1.119 1.335 1.280
Mean, Spread, Retail (E[RK
′
/Q]−RD′) 2.990 3.196 3.270
Bank Runs
Runs per 100 Years 3.105 2.909 2.630
Recovery Rate (xt|Runt) 78.213 78.728 79.427
Welfare 0.850 0.848 0.846
Table 4: Correcting for the spillover effect. Results are from a simulation of 10000
economies for 2000 periods, discarding the first 1000 periods. Baseline is the baseline
model without regulation and anticipated bank runs. Regulation with spillover is
a version of the model in which retail banks are regulated, with τRNoRun = 0.5, but
shadow banks are not. Regulation without spillover is a version of the model, in
which both retail banks and shadow banks are regulated, with τRNoRun = 0.5 and
τS ≈ 0.11
per 100 years in the case without the spillover effect as opposed to by only 0.2
runs per 100 years in the case with the spillover effect. Recovery rates increase
by over 1.3 percentage points as opposed to only 0.5 percentage points. This
shows that the spillover effect, which arises mostly due to the relaxation of
the leverage constraint of shadow banks in response to safer retail banks, has
substantial implications for the effectiveness of macroprudential retail bank
capital requirements.
Looking at macroeconomic aggregates, we can see that a retail bank capital
requirement without the spillover effect reduces output volatility somewhat,
as opposed to increasing it. It does however also reduce average output, con-
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sumption and investment more than the policy which allows for the spillover
effect. This also explains why the policy overall leads to an additional welfare
loss.
7 Conclusion
We study the macroeconomic effects of bank capital regulation in a quanti-
tative model with retail banks and shadow banks. In our model, financial
crises occur in the form of runs on shadow banks. There is a role for regula-
tion in the model because banks do not internalize that their decisions affect
the likelihood of financial crises, which leads to over-borrowing during normal
times.
Overall, we have established that the welfare gains from policies which
eliminate shadow bank runs are potentially very large. Most of the welfare
gains stem from eliminating fears about future shadow bank runs, which re-
laxes the leverage constraint of shadow banks. Hence, they can invest more,
which leads to a higher level of output, consumption and investment.
Retail bank capital requirements can reduce the frequency and severity of
shadow bank runs by allowing retail banks to better absorb the liquidated as-
sets of shadow banks in a bank run. However, retail bank capital requirements
lead to substantial spillover effects, especially if fears about future constraints
are present. Eliminating these spillover effects has considerable scope for in-
creasing the effectiveness of retail bank capital regulation.
An interesting extension of our model would be to include sticky prices
and nominal debt. A bank run could then result in a Fisherian debt deflation
spiral: The initial effects of the run depresses goods prices, which worsens
the real debt burden of banks, which in term depresses investment, and so on.
Bank runs can then lead to episodes that cause the economy to be at the lower
bound of the nominal policy interest rate. In this case, the possibility of bank
runs will also affect how monetary policy should be conducted.
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Appendix
For Online Publication
A Steady State
We focus on the case of the model under a binding capital requirement. Our
approach is to first characterize the steady state allocation of capital for a
given aggregate capital stock K. We then explain how the aggregate capital
stock is determined. Given K, we can compute the gross return on capital
and the wage as
RK = αKα−1 + 1− δ (A.1)
W = (1− α)ZKα (A.2)
Steady state interest rates are determined by the first order conditions with
respect to DHt+1, and B
R
t+1:
RD =
1
β
(A.3)
RB = γ
RK
1 + fR
+ (1− γ)RD (A.4)
Given RK , KH is determined by the euler equation of the household with
respect to KH
RK =
1
β
(
1 + ηH
KH
K
)
(A.5)
KH
K
=
1
ηH
(
βRK − 1) (A.6)
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We can now characterize the steady state allocation for the shadow banks:
First, from the balance sheet constraint of shadow banks follows
B = KS −NS (A.7)
Plugging this into the law of motion for aggregate net worth, we can write net
worth as
NS =
υSK
1−
[
(RK −RB) KS
NS
+RB
]
(1− σS)
. (A.8)
From the incentive constraint, we then get a quadratic condition for KS/NS:
ψ
[
ω
KS
NS
+ (1− ω)
]
= β
[
σS + (1− σS)ψ
[
ω
KS
NS
+ (1− ω)
]]
1
1− σS
(
1− υS K
NS
)
= β
[
σS + (1− σS)ψ
[
ω
KS
NS
+ (1− ω)
]]((
RK −RB) KS
NS
+RB
)
(A.9)
We then can infer KS = KS/NSNS. The fraction of capital holdings of retail
banks are given by the market clearing condition for capital goods:
KR
K
= 1− K
H
K
− K
S
K
. (A.10)
From the balance sheet of the retail banking sector, we get
D =
(
1 + ηR
KR
K
)
KR +B −NR. (A.11)
This allows us to substitute out D in the law of motion for aggregate net
worth:
NR = (RKKR +RBB −RDD)(1− σR) + υRK
=
(
RKKR +RBB −RD
((
1 + ηR
KR
K
)
KR +B −NR
))
(1− σR) + υRK
=
((
RK −
(
1 + ηR
KR
K
)
RD
)
KR
NR
+
(
RB −RD) B
NR
+RD
)
NR(1− σR) + υRK
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Hence,
NR =
υRK
1− (1− σR)
((
RK −
(
1 + ηRK
R
K
)
RD
)
KR
NR
+ (RB −RD) B
NR
+RD
) .
(A.12)
Finally, from the capital requirement, we get(
1 + ηR
KR
K
)
KR + γB = φ¯
υRK
1− (1− σR)
((
RK −
(
1 + ηRK
R
K
)
RD
)
KR
NR
+ (RB −RD) B
NR
+RD
)
(A.13)
Substituting in the solutions for B from equation A.7, NR from equation A.12
and KR/K, from equation A.10 this is a complicated nonlinear equation in K
only.
Some additional variables of interest can be calculated residually. Total
output is given by:
Y = ZKα + υRK + υSK − ηH
(
KH
K
)2
K − ηR
(
KR
K
)2
K. (A.14)
Then, household consumption is characterized by the aggregate budget con-
straint:
CH = Y − δK − σRN
R − υRK
1− σR − σ
SN
S − υSK
1− σS . (A.15)
A.1 Comparative Statics in Steady State
In this section, we explore the steady state implications of retail bank capital
requirements. We characterize the non-stochastic steady state equilibrium
absent of bank runs in Appendix A.
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Figure 6: Steady state effect of a retail bank capital requirement on the capital
allocation and the aggregate capital stock.
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A.1.1 Retail Bank Capital Requirements
Figure 6 shows the comparative statics for varying the retail bank capital re-
quirement in steady state. We vary the minimum capital requirement between
0 and 25 percent.
In panel (a), we show how increasing retail bank capital requirements
changes the capital allocation among households and banks. The solid line
is the share of capital held by households, the dotted line is the share of retail
bank capital holdings and the dashed line is the share of shadow bank capital
holdings. For a retail bank capital requirement below 10 percent, the capital
requirement is not binding and the retail bank leverage ratio is determined by
its incentive constraint.
For a retail bank capital requirement between 10 and 25 percent, the cap-
ital requirement is binding and retail banks will invest in both capital and
wholesale lending. As the capital requirement increases in this range, retail
banks substitute away from capital lending to wholesale lending. This is be-
cause an additional unit of capital lending requires 1/φ¯ of equity finance, while
an additional unit of wholesale lending only requires γ/φ¯ of equity finance. If
the regulator tightens the retail bank capital requirement, wholesale lending
will therefore become relatively more attractive for retail banks. Hence, di-
rect capital holdings by retail banks decrease, and capital holdings by shadow
banks increase in this range.
For a capital requirement above 25 percent, retail banks will only invest
through wholesale lending. If the regulator increases the capital requirement
in this range, retail banks can no longer substitute away from capital holding
and therefore can only reduce wholesale lending. Consequently, both retail
and shadow banks will reduce their assets in this range.
In panel (b), we show the aggregate capital stock as a function of the capital
requirement. Increasing retail bank capital requirements decreases the steady
state capital stock substantially. The reason for this strong effect is that banks
in this economy cannot raise outside equity from households. Hence, a higher
capital requirement forces retail banks to sharply cut the asset side of their
balance sheet, which in turn forces the shadow banks to reduce their assets
49
as well. If banks could issue equity to households, their required return on
equity would not increase monotonically with a higher capital requirement,
which would imply a lower bound on the aggregate capital stock.
In panels (c) and (d), we consider the effects of capital requirements on
the deposit and wholesale funding markets. Higher retail bank capital re-
quirements increase the wholesale funding markets, as retail banks substitute
away from direct lending to the non-financial sector towards wholesale lending.
Deposit borrowing decreases, as higher capital requirements imply that retail
banks need to reduce leverage.
In panels (e) and (f), we show the effects of capital requirements on shadow
and retail bank leverage. There is a spill-over effect from higher retail bank
capital requirements on shadow bank leverage: As retail banks reduce their
assets, returns on assets increase, which increases shadow bank profitability
and allows them to take on more leverage. Retail bank leverage decreases with
higher retail bank capital requirements by construction.
A.1.2 Shadow Bank Capital Requirements
In Figure 7, we show the comparative statics for the steady state for different
levels of the shadow bank capital requirement. We again vary the shadow
bank capital requirement between zero and 25 percent.
As we show in panel (a), an increase in shadow bank capital requirements
reduces the fraction of capital held by shadow banks in steady state, and
increases the fraction of capital held by the retail banks. Households also hold
a larger fraction of the capital stock.
Nevertheless, the aggregate capital stock decreases, as we see in panel (b).
The reason is that shadow banks have to reduce leverage as they have to
comply with the higher capital requirement. This in turn forces them to sell
capital, which will only partially be absorbed by households and retail banks,
who are less efficient at holding capital.
Panels (c) and (d) show that in stark contrast to retail bank capital re-
quirements, shadow bank capital requirements reduce the size of the wholesale
funding market and the retail funding market. The former market decreases
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Figure 7: Steady state effect of a shadow bank capital requirement on the
capital allocation and the aggregate capital stock.
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directly, because shadow banks have to reduce leverage, The latter market
becomes smaller, since retail banks substitute away from wholesale lending
to direct lending, which can be more easily diverted and hence requires more
equity financing.
By construction, shadow bank leverage decreases with a higher capital
requirement, as we show in panel (e). In panel (f), we can see that retail
bank leverage increases with a higher capital requirement. There are two
effects at work: First, as the capital stock decreases, the return on capital
goes up, which increases the profitability and hence the leverage capacity of
retail banks. Second, the substitution away from wholesale lending towards
direct lending increases retail bank leverage directly, since direct lending has
a higher weight in the calculation of retail bank leverage.
B Equilibrium Conditions in the Dynamic Model
B.1 Households
The first-order conditions of the households’ problem with respect to capital
holding KHt+1 and deposit D
H
t+1 are given by:
FOC(KHt+1) :
1
CHt
(Qt + η
HK
H
t+1
Kt
) = βEt
(
1
CHt+1
RKt+1
)
(B.1)
FOC(DHt+1) :
1
CHt
= βEt
(
1
CHt+1
RDt+1
)
(B.2)
The interpretation of these first-order conditions is standard. In the first
expression, the left-hand side and the right-hand side are the marginal cost
and marginal benefit of capital holding, respectively. The marginal cost of
capital holding has two components. One is the price the households have to
pay for purchasing the capital goods, and the second is the capital holding
cost due to households’ low investment skills.
In addition, the households decide how much capital to hold through the
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retail banking sector. The first order condition with respect to KRt+1 yields a
first order condition which pins down fRt :
fRt = η
R
(
KRt+1
Kt
)
.
Aggregate consumption of the household sector can be inferred from the
resource constraint of the economy. Therefore, we do not have to track the
net worth of households as a state variable.
CHt = ZtK
α
t + υ
RKt + υ
SKt − η
H
2
(
KHt+1
Kt
)2
Kt − η
R
2
(
KRt+1
Kt
)2
Kt
− It − θ
2
(
It
Kt
− δ
)2
Kt − σRN
R
t − υRKt
1− σR − σ
SN
S
t − υSKt
1− σS
B.2 Banks
B.2.1 Shadow banks
The incentive constraint of the shadow bank is given by
ψ(nSt + ωb
S
t+1) = βEt
[
V St+1
]
. (B.3)
The balance sheet constraint of the shadow bank reads
Qtk
S
t+1 = n
S
t + b
S
t+1 (B.4)
The net worth of an incumbent shadow bank is
nSt = R
K
t k
S
t −RBt bSt (B.5)
The value of the shadow bank before the realization of the exit shock is given
by
V St = σ
SnSt + (1− σS)βEt
[
V St+1
]
= σSnSt + (1− σS)ψ(nSt + ωbSt+1),
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where the second line uses the binding incentive constraint to substitute out
the continuation value. Plugging this expression into B.3 yields the following
characterization for the shadow banks choices for kSt+1 and b
S
t+1:
ψ(nSt + ωb
S
t+1) = βEt
[
(σS + (1− σS)ψ)nSt+1 + ψω(1− σS)bSt+2
]
(B.6)
Qtk
S
t+1 = n
S
t + b
S
t+1 (B.7)
nSt = R
K
t k
S
t −RBt bSt (B.8)
We now conjecture and verify that the policy functions for bSt+1 and k
S
t+1 are
linear in net worth, such that it is sufficient to characterize the optimal choices
of the shadow banking sector as a whole in equilibrium.
Theorem B.1 (Linearity of Policy Functions). The policy functions for bSt+1
and kSt+1 which solve the problem of the shadow bank given by equations B.6 to
B.8 are linear in net worth.
Proof. Suppose that the policy functions are given by bSt+1 = A
S
b n
S
t and k
S
t+1 =
ASkn
S
t , respectively. Then, it follows from equation B.8 that
nSt+1 = R
K
t+1k
S
t+1 −RBt+1bSt+1
= (RKt+1A
S
k −RBt+1ASb )nSt
= ASnn
S
t .
From equation B.7 follows that
QtA
S
kn
S
t = n
S
t + A
S
b n
S
t
ASk =
1 + ASb
Qt
.
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Finally, from B.6 follows that
ψ(1 + ωASb )n
S
t = βEt
[
(σS + (1− σS)ψ(1 + ωASb ))nSt+1
]
= βEt
[
(σS + (1− σS)ψ(1 + ωASb ))ASn
]
nSt
= βEt
[
(σS + (1− σS)ψ(1 + ωASb ))(RKt+1
1 + ASb
Qt
−RBt+1ASb )
]
nSt
This equation yields a solution for ASb that is independent of n
S
t .
23 Conse-
quently, ASk and A
S
n are also independent of n
S
t .
Given the linearity of policy functions, it is sufficient to characterize the
policies KSt+1 and B
S
t+1 of the aggregate shadow banking sector. These choices
are the solutions to
ψ(NSt + ωB
S
t+1) = βEt
[
(σS + (1− σS)ψ)N
S
t+1 − υSKSt+1
1− σS + ψω(1− σ
S)BSt+2
]
QtK
S
t+1 = N
S
t +B
S
t+1
NSt = (R
K
t K
S
t −RBt BSt )(1− σS) + υRKSt .
B.2.2 Retail banks, No Regulation
We characterize the problem of a retail banks under a non-binding and a
binding capital requirement. First, we consider the problem of a retail bank
where the incentive constraint is binding. The incentive constraint is given by
ψ((Qt + f
R
t )k
R
t+1 + γb
R
t+1) = βEt
[
V Rt+1
]
. (B.9)
The balance sheet constraint reads:
(Qt + f
R
t )k
R
t+1 + b
R
t+1 = n
R
t + d
R
t . (B.10)
23Specifically, the solution is given by ASb = −p +
√
p2 + q, with p =
− 12
(1/β−Et[RKt+1/Qt])−Et[RKt+1/Qt−RBt+1]
ωEt[RKt+1/Qt−RBt+1]
and q =
1/β−Et[(σS+(1−σS)ψ)RKt+1/Qt]
ωEt[RKt+1/Qt−RBt+1]
. When
Et
[
RKt+1/Qt −RBt+1
]
> 0 and Et
[
RBt+1 − 1/β
]
> 0, this solution is unique.
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Net worth is determined according to
nRt = R
K
t k
R
t +R
B
t b
R
t −RDt dRt . (B.11)
These three equations pin down kRt+1, d
R
t+1 and n
R
t . b
R
t+1 is determined by a
first order condition of the retail banks problem:
max
{kRs+1,bRs+1,dRs+1}∞s=t
βEt
[
V Rt+1
]
s.t.
V Rt = σ
RnRt + (1− σR)ψ((Qt + fRt )kRt+1 + γbRt+1)
nRt + d
R
t+1 = (Qt + f
R
t )k
R
t+1 + b
R
t+1
ψ((Qt + f
R
t )k
R
t+1 + γb
R
t+1) = βEt
[
V Rt+1
]
nRt = R
K
t k
R
t +R
B
t b
R
t −RDt dRt
kRt+1, d
R
t+1, b
R
t+1 ≥ 0.
We conjecture, as in the shadow banking problem, that the policy functions
for kRt+1, b
R
t+1 and d
R
t+1 are linear in net worth n
R
t :
kRt+1 = A
R
k n
R
t
bRt+1 = A
R
b n
R
t
dRt+1 = A
R
d n
R
t
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Plugging in the conjectured policy functions, we can rewrite the maximization
problem as
max
{kRs+1,bRs+1}∞s=t
βEt
[
V Rt+1
]
s.t.
V Rt+1 = (σ
R + (1− σR)ψ((Qt+1 + fRt+1)ARk + γARb ))nRt+1
ψ((Qt + f
R
t )k
R
t+1 + γb
R
t+1) = βEt
[
V Rt+1
]
nRt+1 = R
K
t+1k
R
t+1 +R
B
t+1b
R
t+1 −RDt+1((Qt + fRt )kRt+1 + bRt+1 − nRt )
kRt+1, d
R
t+1, b
R
t+1 ≥ 0.
Defining ΩRt+1 ≡ V Rt+1/nRt+1 = (σR + (1 − σR)ψ((Qt+1 + fRt+1)ARk + γARb )), the
Lagrangian for this problem is given by
L = βEt
[
ΩRt+1(R
K
t+1k
R
t+1 +R
B
t+1b
R
t+1 −RDt+1((Qt + fRt )kRt+1 + bRt+1 − nRt ))
]
+ λ
[
ψ((Qt + f
R
t )k
R
t+1 + γb
R
t+1)
−βEt
[
ΩRt+1(R
K
t+1k
R
t+1 +R
B
t+1b
R
t+1 −RDt+1((Qt + fRt )kRt+1 + bRt+1 − nRt ))
]]
This yields the following first order conditions:
∂L
∂kRt+1
= βEt
[
ΩRt+1(R
K
t+1 −RDt+1(Qt + fRt ))
]
(1− λ) + λψ(Qt + fRt ) = 0
∂L
∂bRt+1
= βEt
[
ΩRt+1(R
B
t+1 −RDt+1)
]
(1− λ) + λψγ = 0
Combining these two equations and rearranging, we arrive at the condition
Et
[
ΩRt+1
(
RKt+1
Qt + fRt
−RDt+1
)]
=
1
γ
Et
[
ΩRt+1(R
B
t+1 −RDt+1)
]
.
This is basically a condition that ensures that the retail bank is indifferent
between lending a marginal unit of funds to final goods producers or on the
wholesale funding market.
Showing the linearity of policy functions works in the same way as in the
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shadow bank problem. Then, in equilibrium, it is sufficient to characterize the
choices KRt+1, B
R
t+1 and D
R
t+1 of the retail banking sector as a whole. These
choices are characterized by the following system of equations:
ψ((Qt + f
R
t )K
R
t+1 + γB
R
t+1) = βEt
[
ΩRt+1
NRt+1 − υRKRt+1
1− σR
]
(Qt + f
R
t )K
R
t+1 +B
R
t+1 = N
R
t +D
R
t
Et
[
ΩRt+1
(
RKt+1
Qt + fRt
−RDt+1
)]
=
1
γ
Et
[
ΩRt+1(R
B
t+1 −RDt+1)
]
NRt = (R
K
t K
R
t +R
B
t B
R
t −RDt DRt )(1− σR) + υRKRt
B.3 Production
From the problem of the capital producer follows
Qt = 1 + θ
(
It
Kt
− δ
)
.
The first order conditions of the final goods producer yield
rKt = αZtK
α−1
t
Wt = (1− α)ZtKαt .
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B.4 Full Statement of the Equilibrium Conditions
B.4.1 No Run Equilibrium
• Household:
1
CHt
(
Qt + η
HK
H
t+1
Kt
)
= βEt
(
1
CHt+1
RKt+1
)
1
CHt
= βEt
(
1
CHt+1
RDt+1
)
fRt = η
RK
R
t+1
Kt
CHt = ZtK
α
t + υ
RKt + υ
SKt − η
H
2
(
KHt+1
Kt
)2
Kt − η
R
2
(
KRt+1
Kt
)2
Kt
− It − θ
2
(
It
Kt
− δ
)2
Kt − σRN
R
t − υRKt
1− σR − σ
SN
S
t − υSKt
1− σS
• Shadow Bank:
ψ(NSt + ωB
S
t+1) = βEt
[
(σS + (1− σS)ψ)N
S
t+1 − υSKSt+1
1− σS + ψω(1− σ
S)BSt+2
]
QtK
S
t+1 = N
S
t +B
S
t+1
NSt = (R
K
t K
S
t −RBt BSt )(1− σS) + υRKSt .
• Retail Bank:
φ¯tN
R
t = (Qt + f
R
t )K
R
t+1 + γB
R
t+1
(Qt + f
R
t )K
R
t+1 +B
R
t+1 = N
R
t +D
R
t
Et
[
ΩRt+1
(
RKt+1
Qt + fRt
−RDt+1
)]
=
1
γ
Et
[
ΩRt+1(R
B
t+1 −RDt+1)
]
ΩRt =
(
σR + (1− σR)ψ
(
(Qt + f
R
t )
KRt+1
N˜Rt
+
BRt+1
N˜Rt
))
NRt = (R
K
t K
R
t +R
B
t B
R
t −RDt DRt )(1− σR) + υRKRt
N˜Rt =
NRt − υRKRt
1− σR
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• Firms:
Qt = 1 + θ
(
It
Kt
− δ
)
RKt = αZtK
α−1
t + (1− δ)Qt
Wt = (1− α)ZtKαt
• Laws of Motion:
KHt+1 +K
R
t+1 +K
S
t+1 = (1− δ)Kt + It
ln(Zt) = (1− ρZ)µZ + ρZ ln(Zt−1) + t
B.4.2 Run Equilibrium
• Household:
1
CH,∗t
(
Q∗t + η
HK
H,∗
t+1
Kt
)
= βEt
[
(1− pi) 1
CHt+1
RKt+1 + pi
1
CH,∗t+1
RK,∗t+1
]
1
CH,∗t
= βEt
[
(1− pi) 1
CHt+1
RDt+1 + pi
1
CH,∗t+1
RDt+1
]
fR,∗t = η
RK
R,∗
t+1
Kt
CH,∗t = ZtK
α
t + υ
RKt − η
H
2
(
KH,∗t+1
Kt
)2
Kt − η
R
2
(
KR,∗t+1
Kt
)2
Kt
− I∗t −
θ
2
(
I∗t
Kt
− δ
)2
Kt − σRN
R,∗
t − υRKt
1− σR
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• Shadow Bank:
CS,∗t = 0
NS,∗t = 0
B∗t+1 = 0
KS,∗t+1 = 0
• Retail Bank:
φ¯tN
R,∗
t = (Qt + f
R
t )K
R,∗
t+1
(Q∗t + f
R,∗
t )K
R,∗
t+1 = N
R,∗
t +D
R,∗
t+1
ΩRt =
(
σR + (1− σR)ψ
(
(Q∗t + f
R,∗
t )
KR,∗t+1
N˜R,∗t
))
NR,∗t = (R
K,∗
t K
R
t + ξtR
K,∗
t K
S
t −RDt DRt )(1− σR) + υRKRt
N˜R,∗t =
NR,∗t − υRKt
1− σR
• Firms:
Q∗t = 1 + θ
(
I∗t
Kt
− δ
)
RK,∗t = αZtK
α−1
t + (1− δ)Q∗t
Wt = (1− α)ZtKαt
• Laws of Motion:
KH,∗t+1 +K
R,∗
t+1 = (1− δ)Kt + I∗t
ln(Zt) = (1− ρZ)µZ + ρZ ln(Zt−1) + t
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C Effects of Financial Frictions on the No-
Bank-Run Equilibrium
Case I: Financially Unconstrained Retail and Shadow Banks Con-
sider a situation in which neither retail banks nor shadow banks are subject
to the moral hazard problem described above and have unlimited liability. In
this case, both types of banks can finance themselves exclusively with debt.
Moreover, from the perspective of the shadow banks, there is no distinction
between deposits and wholesale loans. This is because, as spelled out in As-
sumption 3, liabilities are different only in the way in which they affect the
incentive constraint of the banks. Hence, in equilibrium, shadow banks must
be indifferent between deposits and wholesale loans, which implies that their
interest rates must be the same:
RBt+1 = R
D
t+1. (C.1)
Moreover, banks will lend to consumption goods producers up to the point
at which the marginal return on retail loans is equal to the marginal cost of
borrowing:
Et
[
Λt,t+1
RAt+1
Qt
]
= Et [Λt,t+1]RBt+1 = Et [Λt,t+1]RDt+1.
This further implies that retail banks or households should not make retail
loans, due to Assumption 1. The model collapses to a model in which only
fully deposit financed shadow banks make retail loans. It is observationally
equivalent to a real business cycle model.
Case II: Financially Unconstrained Retail Banks, Financially Con-
strained Shadow Banks If retail banks are not subject to the moral hazard
problem, but shadow banks are, shadow banks are no longer indifferent be-
tween deposit financing and wholesale financing. This is because wholesale
financing requires shadow banks to use less (costly) net worth to finance one
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unit of retail loans. Further, shadow banks are now subject to default risk,
which implies that xt can be smaller than 1. Since shadow banks are con-
strained, they cannot lend up to the point where the return on their assets
equals the return on their liabilities. Hence,
Et
[
Λt,t+1
RAt+1
Qt
]
> Et
[
Λt,t+1xt+1R
B
t+1
]
.
This spread implies that it will be optimal for retail banks and households to
make some retail loans. Moreover, retail banks must be indifferent between
making retail loans and making wholesale loans. Hence
Et
[
Λt,t+1
RAt+1
Qt + fRt
]
= Et
[
Λt,t+1xt+1R
B
t+1
]
.
Retail banks will make loans up to the point where the return on deposits
equals the return on retail or wholesale lending:
Et
[
Λt,t+1
RAt+1
Qt + fRt
]
= Et
[
Λt,t+1xt+1R
B
t+1
]
= Et [Λt,t+1]RDt+1.
In this model, both shadow banks and retail banks will make retail loans, and
there will be an active wholesale lending market, where retail banks lend to
shadow banks. There is a spread between the return on deposits and the return
on wholesale loans which reflects the risk-adjusted probability of a shadow
bank run:
RBt+1 =
Et [Λt,t+1]
Et
Λt,t+1 xt+1︸︷︷︸
≤1

︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥1
RDt+1. (C.2)
In principle, this model is qualitatively consistent with the flow of funds as
shown in Figure 2. However, this model cannot deliver quantitatively impor-
tant bank run risk, since unconstrained retail banks can easily and cheaply
absorb the liquidated assets of shadow banks in a systemic bank default.
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Case III: Financially Constrained Retail and Shadow Banks If both
retail and shadow banks are constrained, there will be a spread between the
return on retail loans issued by retail banks and the return on deposits, since
retail banks cannot lever up to the point where returns equalize:
Et
[
Λt,t+1
RAt+1
Qt + fRt
]
> Et [Λt,t+1]RDt+1,
and
Et
[
Λt,t+1xt+1R
B
t+1
]
> Et [Λt,t+1]RDt+1.
Moreover, retail banks are willing to accept a lower return on wholesale loans
compared to retail loans, since they need less net worth to finance a given
amount of wholesale loans compared to retail loans:
γEt
[
Λt,t+1Ω
R
t+1
(
RAt+1
Qt + fRt
−RDt+1
)]
= Et
[
Λt,t+1Ω
R
t+1
(
xt+1R
B
t+1 −RDt+1
)]
.
The marginal value of an additional unit of net worth ΩRt+1 shows up, since
for financially constrained banks, ΩRt+1 is stochastic and in general Ω
R
t+1 > 1.
Hence, the return on wholesale loans is given by
RBt+1 =
γEt
[
Λt,t+1Ω
R
t+1
RAt+1
Qt+fRt
]
+ (1− γ)Et
[
Λt,t+1Ω
R
t+1
]
RDt+1
Et
[
Λt,t+1ΩRt+1xt+1
] . (C.3)
The numerator represents the cost of an additional unit of wholesale loans,
which consists of the opportunity cost of reducing retail lending by γ units
and the cost of raising an additional 1− γ units of deposits. Moreover, there
is an adjustment for the risk-adjusted loss in default in the denominator. In
contrast to equation C.2 in the previous case, this term now contains the value
of an additional unit of net worth to the shadow bank. Hence, in this model,
it is not only borrower balance sheet characteristics, but also lender balance
sheet characteristics which determine the equilibrium on the wholesale funding
market. In particular, in states in which net worth is particularly scarce for
retail banks, e.g. due to a large loss, the spread of the retail and wholesale
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lending rates over the deposit rate will rise.
D Computation
D.1 Solution
We solve the model nonlinearly using a time iteration algorithm. Solving the
model nonlinearly is important, because bank runs can lead to large deviations
from steady state, where perturbation algorithms are inaccurate.
The state space of the model is S = (NR, NS, K, Z) in the ”no bank run”
equilibrium and S∗ = (NR,∗, K, Z) in the ”bank run” equilibrium. We approx-
imate the consumption policy functions CH(S), V R(S), V S(S), CH,∗(S∗) and
V R,∗(S∗) and the capital prices Q(S) and Q∗(S∗) using fourth order polynomi-
als. We compute the polynomial coefficients by imposing that the polynomial
approximations must be equal to the original functions on the grid. Specifi-
cally, denoting the polynomial coefficients by α and the polynomials by Π(S),
we impose for example for the consumption of households
Π(Si)αCH = CH(Si) i = 1, . . . , N. (D.1)
for all N grid points. We use a Smolyak grid with order µ = 5 for the endoge-
nous and exogenous states. We compute the Smolyak grid and polynomials
using the toolbox by Judd, Maliar, Maliar, and Valero (2014).
One slight complication of the model is that the future net worth values
NR and NS, depends on Q(S). This implies that, for example, the household
net worth for a given function Q(.) must be computed as a solution to the
nonlinear function24
NR,
′
=
[
(rK + (1− δ)Q(NR,′ , NS,′ , K ′, Z ′))KR,′ +RB,′B′ −RD,′D′
]
(1−σR)+υRK.
(D.2)
With this in mind, we will now outline our solution algorithm for the ”no
24In principle, ΠQ is also a function of the states. We ignore this here for the sake of
exposition. We do however account for this correctly in the code.
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bank run” equilibrium. Suppose we are in iteration k and have initial guesses
for the no-run consumption policy functions CH(k)(S), V R(k)(S), and V S(k)(S) and
the capital price function Q(k)(S) as well as values for the future net worth
NR,
′
(k) and N
S,′
(k).
1. Given the value functions and the future net worth, compute the future
value functions and capital prices as
CH
′
(k) = C
H
(k)(S ′(k)),
Q′(k) = Q(k)(S ′(k)),
and so on.
2. Compute the new values for (KH,
′
, KR,
′
, KS,
′
, D′, B′, RD,
′
, RB,
′
, Q) for all
grid points i = 1, . . . , N using the first order conditions B.1, B.2, B.9,
B.10, B.3, 2.25 and the leverage constraints 2.5 and 2.6. Compute the
future net worth where necessary according to
N˜R,
′
(k+1) =
[
(rK,
′
+ (1− δ)Q(k)(NR,′(k) , NS,
′
(k), K
′, Z ′))KH,
′
+RB,
′
B′ −RD,′D′
]
(1−σR)+υRK ′.
(D.3)
We compute expectations using Gauss-Hermite quadrature. Note that
for each quadrature node Z ′, a different value of N˜R,
′
(k+1) must be com-
puted.
3. Using the new policies and prices, update the consumption function of
the household using equation 2.34, and the value functions for the retail
and shadow banks using equation 2.1.
4. Update the next period net worth values using D.3, with some attenua-
tion: NR,
′
(k+1) = (1− ι)NR,
′
(k) + ιN˜
R,′
(k+1), with ι = 0.5.
5. Repeat until the errors in the consumption, capital price and net worth
values on the grid are small. We iterate until the maximum error in
consumption is smaller than 1e-5 and the maximum error in the net
worth is smaller than 1e-5.
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If bank runs are unanticipated, we can first solve for the ”no bank run”
equilibrium and then afterwards for the ”bank run” equilibrium. Importantly,
expectations during a bank run are taken over the future ”bank run” and ”no
bank run” states. It is therefore necessary to keep track of two sets of net
worth values, NR,
′
(k) and N
R,′,∗
(k) . Otherwise, the algorithm works in the same
way as for the ”no bank run” equilibrium. For the anticipated run case, we
use the unanticipated run case as initial guess and solve jointly for the ”no
bank run” and ”bank run” policy functions.
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